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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM

JUAN E. MÉNDEZ*

I. INTRODUCTION
It is a privilege to be given the opportunity to comment on Harold H.
Koh’s Childress Lecture on A United State’s Human Rights Policy for the 21st
Century. Indeed, the choice of a topic could hardly have been more prescient:
after September 11, 2001, the very possibility of an enlightened foreign policy,
one designed at least in part to defend and promote human rights everywhere,
is called into question. Saint Louis University and the organizers of the
Childress Lecture deserve praise for tackling a difficult issue at a time when
public opinion is so thoroughly imbued with an unquestioningly patriotic spirit.
It will be hard for some time to have a serious debate about the content of the
“national interests” of the United States, or about whether such interests are
best served by war. It will be difficult for a long time to come to engage in a
serious discussion about what are the demands of justice regarding the terrorist
attacks on U.S. soil, or how to draw a line between justice and revenge. But
precisely because it will take time, it is important to start now.
This reaction to Professor Koh’s thoughtful address is written from the
perspective of a citizen of the Third World who has had the good fortune of
living in the United States since 1977 and the privilege of working with this
country’s foremost human rights organizations. The uniqueness of this
perspective warrants two early disclaimers: I cannot speak for the human rights
movement of the developing countries, and I certainly do not claim to speak
for U.S.-based human rights organizations; they manage to get their points
across without much difficulty in any event. On the other hand, most of my
professional experience has taken place in close contact with the fascinating
process of formulating and implementing human rights as a principal
component of U.S. foreign policy. The advances and setbacks that marked that
process, now more than a quarter century old, are—I think—an important
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framework within which to consider the challenges that the terrorist attacks of
September 11 present to the human rights movement around the world.
In the light of those experiences, this Essay argues that the aftermath of
September 11 creates the serious risk of undermining all the gains made by the
American public and U.S. institutions in installing human rights as central to
this country’s foreign policy. If this risk is realized, then Professor Koh’s
proposal will meet an untimely and undeserved early demise. On the other
hand, this essay also expresses the hope that the human rights movement, with
the power of the idea of human rights and their place as core values embraced
by the American public, can overcome this perilous moment and prevail again.
II. THE RUSH TO WAR AND THE NEED FOR A PROPER CHARACTERIZATION OF
SEPTEMBER 11
From the perspective of international human rights law, the attacks of
September 11 are not only acts of terrorism, but also crimes against humanity,
since they were designed to kill large number of civilians who took no part in
hostilities.1 Since there was at the time no state of war between the
perpetrators and the United States, this characterization extends as well to the
attack on the Pentagon, though most of its victims were not civilians. Even if
we thought of these attacks in the context of armed conflict, the use of
commercial aircraft full of civilians, turning those airplanes into weapons of
mass destruction, and the indiscriminate nature of the attack, would suffice to
consider them war crimes. The importance of labeling these acts as crimes
against humanity or war crimes is the legal effect of such a characterization: as
to them, the international community is collectively committed to their
investigation, prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators, and offering
reparations to the victims.
There does not appear to be much room for disagreement on this
characterization. And yet, in his first appearance after the attacks, President

1. Crimes against humanity are a special category of human rights violations. They involve
murder, torture, disappearances, prolonged arbitrary detention, reduction to slavery and other
grave offenses, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Human rights organizations have long
avoided the use of the word “terrorism” to categorize certain serious crimes, in large part because
of the highly charged and ideological connotation of the concept. Nevertheless, even using a
rigorous definition of terrorism, the acts of September 11 certainly fit it. For these purposes, I
refer to the definition used by Professor Koh, which he in turn borrows from a U.N. General
Assembly Resolution of Jan. 30, 2001. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights
Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 330 n.100 (2002); Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 55/158, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 164, at 2, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/55/158 (2001).
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George W. Bush called them “acts of war,” and not just terrorism.2 Apparently
President Bush and his advisers consider an act of terrorism less morally
objectionable than an act of war. Terrorism, however, carries a much harsher
and universal moral condemnation, no matter one’s cultural or philosophical
starting point. Those who wage war in self-defense, or as a last resort to
protect other human beings, as long as they fight in full compliance with the
laws of war, deserve to be treated with respect. Terrorists, on the other hand,
deliberately and wantonly break with every tradition of the laws of war: they
resort to perfidy, they sow fear in the population, and they make the innocent
pay for the real or supposed crimes of others.3
Undoubtedly, the characterization of September 11 as an act of war has
had useful practical consequences. It has instantly created a state of
consciousness in the American public that justifies the resort to warlike actions
in response to the attacks of that date. It has also shifted attention completely
away from what could have been a more useful, pragmatic and morally more
solid response: a law enforcement operation to bring the accomplices of the
suicidal attackers to justice. This is not to say that the United States does not
have a causus belli for the operations now going on in Afghanistan. Under the
protection of the Taliban regime, Al Qaeda posed a threat of further attacks,
and that fact alone justified the legitimate exercise of self-defense on the part
of the United States. But self-defense is limited by immediacy and
proportionality, and at this point it is unclear if the heavy bombing, the use of
proxy fighters and the effort to drive the Taliban out of power can all be
justified by self-defense.
In January 2002, as this is being written, it seems superfluous to engage in
any discussion of these points; events on the ground have moved the debate
well beyond decisions as to what use of force is legitimate. Still, it is
important to be able to draw a line between self-defense and reprisal. The
sentiment among most Americans may well be in favor of exacting revenge for
the attacks of September 11; we should not forget that those sentiments are at
least in part spurred on by the irresponsible talk of political leaders and
commentators that shower us with hourly barrages of saber-rattling from the
safety of their television studios. In the end, however, we must reckon with the
fact that reprisals are not permitted in international law. For that reason alone,
we must keep in mind the distinction between self-defense and reprisal.
2. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, By the President of the United States of
America, National Day of Prayer and Remembrance for the Victims Of the Terrorist Attacks on
September 11, 2001 (Sept. 13, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010913-7.html.
3. Combatants are prohibited from disguising themselves before or during an attack. It is
perfidy to mislead the opponent into believing that one is a person protected from attack by the
laws of war. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, art. 37, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
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Beyond international law, ethical considerations also require that we make that
distinction: crimes against humanity like the attacks of September 11 create a
demand for justice, not for reprisal.
The legitimacy of the U.S. response to the attacks of September 11 has
immediate consequences for the question of what place human rights can have
in American foreign policy. The United States can shape events in other lands
and influence the way other States treat their citizens, and in fact almost
invariably does so, whether it deliberately seeks to have a human rights policy
or not. That influence, however, is most effective and favorable to human
rights when the citizens of other societies perceive it as a genuine effort to
uphold human rights for their own sake, and not as a tool for other foreign
policy interests. In this instance, most citizens of other countries instantly
sympathize with the grief felt by Americans for the death and destruction of
September 11; however, that sympathy does not translate into support for the
combat operations by the United States in Afghanistan. American leaders may
characterize the war as a way of seeking justice; for the rest of the world,
however, it looks a lot more like reprisal.4 Of course, the foreign policy of the
United States should not be guided by opinion polls in other countries.
However, if there is eventually to be a human rights policy along the lines
proposed by Professor Koh, its prospects of success will depend largely on
whether the United States is perceived as an honest and impartial defender of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and not as a super-power that is all
too eager to display its awesome destructive power on one of the world’s
poorest nations.
The question of the legitimacy of going to war must be followed by a
serious discussion of the means and methods to be employed in war. In
international law, these separate issues are treated under the familiar distinction
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The point of the distinction is precisely to
insist that both the resort to war and the way it is conducted must be guided by
moral and legal principles. In other words, even if the resort to war can be
justified, the belligerent is always and in all instances obligated to use means
and methods of warfare that distinguish properly between military and civilian
targets, that protect non-combatants from harm and that respect the life and
dignity of those no longer taking an active part in hostilities.
At this point, it may be too early to judge the extent to which all American
military operations in Afghanistan are in compliance with these simple rules.
There are troubling signs that at least some of them raise serious questions in

4. This is how I perceive the state of public opinion in the Third World on this matter from
conversations with human rights activists, journalists and democratic politicians in the course of
recent travels in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and El Salvador. Though
admittedly impressionistic, it coincides with news accounts about opinion polls in those and other
countries.
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this regard.5 And yet the attitude of the Bush Administration and the Pentagon
is to disregard any such information as “unsubstantiated” without any serious
effort to examine them or to provide the means for a further inquiry.
Unfortunately, this refusal to respond to valid questions about specific episodes
is nothing new. There has been no serious self-examination of the destruction
of an insane asylum in Grenada during the U.S. attack on that island country in
1983.6 There has been no account of how the poor Panamanian neighborhood
of Chorrillo was burned to the ground in the course of the attack on the
headquarters of the National Guard during the December 1989 invasion of
Panama.7 No serious inquiry was ever made on the killing of Iraqi soldiers
who were returning to Baghdad, hours after the cease-fire in the Persian Gulf
War.8 In the bombing of Yugoslavia during the war over Kosovo, there have
been inadequate explanations of the destruction of the Chinese Embassy and a
television station, and even less of the use of cluster bombs.
This refusal to conduct serious inquiries or to answer simple questions is a
serious mistake. Independent monitors and investigators do not assume any
wrongdoing on the part of the Pentagon; they simply apply to American
military actions the same standards and burdens of persuasion that are applied
to other forces when they provoke civilian casualties in suspicious
circumstances. By refusing to respond seriously to such inquiries, American
military authorities only breed the now pervasive sentiment abroad that, if
American servicemen violate the laws of war, their commanders will cover up

5. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: U.S. Bombs Kill Twenty-three
Civilians: Rights Groups Urges Immediate Investigation, Oct. 26, 2001, http://www.hrw.org/
press/2001/10/afghan1026.htm; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: New Civilian
Deaths Due to U.S. Bombing, Oct. 30, 2001, http://www.hrw.org/ press/2001/10/afghan1030.htm;
Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, HUM RTS. WATCH BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 31, 2001,
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/cluster-bck1031.htm. The United States government must also
assume responsibility for the crimes that may be committed by Northern Alliance soldiers
fighting with American strategic support. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Don’t
Support Legislation Against War Crimes Court, Oct. 5, 2001, http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/10/
icc1005.htm (discussing the previous record of the Northern Alliance). In particular, there should
be serious investigations into the early news reports about the killing of Taliban soldiers out of
combat. The Pentagon should offer a thorough explanation about the circumstances in which
hundreds of non-Afghan Taliban prisoners lost their lives in the prison riots of November 25 and
26, and about the inhumane conditions of detention of other prisoners held by a U.S. ally through
March. Dexter Filkins, Marooned Taliban Count Out Grim Hours in an Afghan Jail, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002.
6. James M. Perry & John J. Fialka, As Panama Outcome Is Praised, Details Emerge of
Bungling During the 1983 Grenada Invasion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1990, at A12.
7. David Gonzalez, 12 Years Later, Scars of the U.S. Invasion Remain, N.Y. TIMES,
November 3, 2001, at A4, available at 2001 WL 29618001; David Corn, Questions for Powell,
272 THE NATION 5, January 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2132172.
8. Seymore Hersh, Overwhelming Force: What Happened in the Final Days of the Gulf
War, THE NEW YORKER, May 22, 2000, at 49-82.
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those crimes. The next time an American diplomat raises serious questions
about the adherence to the laws of war by any other country or military force,
his or her credibility will be seriously impaired by this pattern of refusal to
engage in serious self-examination. Alternatively, the Administration will find
itself watering down its critique of others’ behavior, in order to avoid being
asked about its own response to American military conduct. Either way, the
harm done to the cause of human rights and to our ability to protect lives and
rights adequately will be enormous.
III. CIVIL LIBERTIES AT HOME AND CREDIBILITY ABROAD
Until now, and with the exception of the death penalty, the United States
could justifiably take the moral high ground in criticizing other countries’
standards of free expression, fair trial guarantees and general treatment of
persons subject to its jurisdiction. No country could fairly respond that the
United States was applying on those matters a standard that it was unwilling to
apply in its own domestic jurisdiction. This premise, from which a credible
human rights policy could flow, is also at the risk of no longer being true after
September 11. The savage attacks have had a traumatic effect on all
Americans and produced many irresponsible calls to cut corners in the fight
against terrorism. Debates over the morality of engaging in torture to exact
confessions (or over handing prisoners to foreign torturers to the same end)
have been as frequent as they have been shallow and mean-spirited; they have
been as morally unsustainable as the arguments we have long heard from
authoritarian figures in countries experiencing turmoil and repression. These
proposals take advantage of the genuine fear we all experience that the trauma
of September 11 can be repeated. Those who make them bargain that
Americans are now ready to trade freedom for security. It is important to
engage the debate from the perspective that we can have, and are entitled to,
both.
The impact of these ideas and debates over the possibility of promotion of
human rights through foreign policy should not be overestimated. Human
rights initiatives by the United States will be judged by what actually becomes
law, not by proposals made by private citizens in the course of free debate.
The fact, however, that the Bush Administration does not adequately distance
itself from some of those ideas affects the credibility of human rights
initiatives abroad.
There is no question that the rest of the world understands the need by the
United States to take some emergency measures that are clearly consistent with
international human rights law. Examples of these are the extended scope of
judicial warrants for wire-tapping telephones, to follow the conversations of a
suspect even if he or she changes telephone numbers frequently. Similarly,
developing informants among networks believed to be associated with
terrorism and even infiltrating those networks with government agents is
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necessary and in principle not inconsistent with human rights standards. The
main risk in all of these actions is that security forces can easily fall into the
trap of racial and religious profiling, a practice that would indeed violate
fundamental principles of non-discrimination.
Other measures actively pursued by the Bush Administration are much
more questionable from the standpoint of constitutional rights and, for that
same reason, create a problem for the credibility of future human rights
initiatives abroad. For example, despite repeated calls from the press, the
Department of Justice has refused to give information about the estimated
1,200 persons arrested since September 11 in connection with on-going
investigations. The Attorney General partially relented after repeated press
inquiries, and released some very cursory information on more than 600
persons still in custody. All of them, according to Mr. Ashcroft, have been
charged with either a criminal or an immigration offense. Significantly, the
public is still uninformed about the identities of these persons, about their
relationship to the crimes of September 11, or about the evidentiary basis for
their continued arrest. The fact that all of those arrested since September 11
are non-Americans probably explains the relatively muted criticism among the
public at large. But we do not need to be reminded that most human rights
standards apply not only to citizens but also to all persons under the State’s
jurisdiction, and no one is more under a State’s jurisdiction than when he or
she is a prisoner of that State. When Peru, Egypt, Nigeria and Russia in the
1990’s arrested even smaller numbers of persons, without offering any names,
identities or explanations as to the probable cause of the arrest, and subjected
them to military tribunals,9 the State Department was more than justified in
issuing strong condemnations.
The amendments to federal criminal procedure and immigration laws
enacted in the aftermath of September 11 also deserve criticism.10 Immigrants
can now be held for seven days without filing criminal or immigration-related
charges (previously the limit was twenty-four hours). The Attorney General
wanted authority to detain immigrants indefinitely and settled for the sevenday limit as a concession to Congressional opposition. In fact, however, since
the Attorney General can initiate deportation proceedings and then suspend
them indefinitely, this concession is pretty much meaningless. Prolonged
arbitrary detention of non-citizens would be a violation of internationally
9. John Shattuck, Human Rights at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2001, at A27.
10. See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). Initial attempts to have a serious debate about the Administration’s
proposals were reportedly curbed by the Democratic Leadership in the Senate, probably under the
notion that the opposition could not afford to look unpatriotic at a time like this. See also Jake
Tapper, Sole Dissenter, Oct. 27, 2001 at http://salon.com/politics/feature/2001/10/27/feingold/
index_np.html.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

384

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:377

recognized standards, and yet it could encourage countless authoritarian
regimes around the world to do the same. It is also a serious breach of
American and international standards to eavesdrop on conversations between
criminal defendants and their attorneys, even if the information thus obtained
is not to be used in court.11 The selection of more than 5,000 aliens of Islamic
background for investigation and questioning smacks of prosecutorial
decisions adopted on the basis of racial and religious “profiling.”12
The one initiative that has been widely criticized by U.S. democratic allies
around the world is the Executive Order creating military commissions to try
foreigners at the President’s discretion, if he has “reason to believe” they are
linked to Al Qaeda.13 Spain has announced that it will refuse to extradite
suspected Al Qaeda members it has arrested unless the United States gives
assurances that they will be tried in civilian courts and will not be subjected to
the death penalty. Other European democracies have let it be known that,
because of the international law rule applying to extradition and human rights
under the European system of protection, they would have to demand the same
condition if they ever capture an Al Qaeda member that the United States
wants extradited. The reason is simple: military jurisdiction to try civilians for
offenses not directly linked to combat violates a cardinal rule of international
human rights law. Military commissions whose members serve at the
discretion of the President by definition do not meet the standard of an
independent and impartial judiciary. The violation of this most basic rule of
due process in criminal matters is compounded by the provisions in the
11. The Department of Justice announced this rule permitting the Bureau of Prisons to
monitor communications between lawyers and their clients on October 31, 2001. Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, Lawyers Committee Condemns Attack on Attorney-Client
Privilege, November 14, 2001, http://www.lchr.org/protect/domestic_terrorism_measures.htm.
Criminal defendants and persons in detention have the right to confidential communications with
their attorneys. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14, Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies,
21st Sess., at 14, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 (1994), available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/gencomm/hrcom13.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2002); see also “soft-law” but authoritative
instruments: Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, Annex, Principle 11, 76th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988); Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, at 118 (1990) (adopted by the 8th U.N. Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders); available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/
h_comp44.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2002); http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/i3bprl.htm.
The principle is also well established in U.S. constitutional law. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
12. See Robin Toner, Civil Liberty vs. Security: Finding a Wartime Balance, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2001, at 1A1; Pam Belluck, Hue and Murmur over Curbed Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2001, at B8.
13. Military Order—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1665 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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Executive Order that allow these commissions to use secret evidence against
the accused, to operate in closed hearings, to deny the defendants access to
counsel of their own choosing, to deny them any form of judicial review or
appeal other than to the President or the Secretary of Defense, and to apply the
death penalty by a two thirds majority of their members and not
unanimously.14 In wartime, prosecution of enemy soldiers who commit war
crimes is allowed before military courts, as long as these are the same courts
applying the same procedures as would be applied to the party’s own officers.
The Executive Order, however, does not limit its jurisdictional scope to
combat-related violations. In addition, these procedures would afford a lower
standard of due process than what applies in martial courts and general military
court jurisdiction.15
As Harold Koh has stated elsewhere,16 this proposal is as wrong-headed as
it is unnecessary: if there is one country in the world whose courts are fully
capable of operating efficiently and affording all fair trial guarantees, it is the
United States. Federal courts have a near perfect record in dealing with
terrorism: Tim McVeigh and his accomplice were tried without major
violations of due process, and the application of those guarantees did not
hinder the possibility of finding them guilty. The federal courts of New York
managed to prosecute and convict all those involved in the early attack on the
World Trade Center, in 1993,17 as well as persons detained abroad and brought
to trial in the United States for the attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa and on
the USS Cole.18 International human rights law allows for suspension of some
rights during a state of emergency that is duly declared, but only in the
measure strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. There is no need in
this case to suspend the operation of the courts that have jurisdiction to hear
these cases, since those courts have suffered no impairment in their capacity to
function. In addition, a criminal conviction and imposition of a penalty,
14. Id. §§ 4, 7.
15. See William Glaberson, Tribunal v. Court-Martial: Matter of Perception, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2001, at 1B6.
16. See Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courts for bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23,
2001, at A39.
17. Peg Tyre, An Icon Destroyed; The Men Behind the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
Fumbled Their Way Toward the First Terrorist Attack on Domestic Soil. Today’s Attack was
Clearly Carried Out By a Different Kind of Group, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, September 11,
2001, at 2001 WL 24138865; Tom Perrotta, City Has Recent History of Terrorism and Trials,
226 NEW YORK L.J. 13 (2001); Dave Williams, The Bombing of the World Trade Center in New
York City, INT’L CRIM. POLICE REV. No. 469-471 (1998), available at http://www.interpol.int/
Public/Publications/ICPR/ICPR469_3.asp.
18. US Embassy Bombing Suspect Warned US About Yemen Attack, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, January 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2323929; Vernon Loeb, Nine Alleged Plotters
Held In Yemen; FBI’s Cole Investigators Are Withdrawn Due to Threat, WASH. POST, June 19,
2001, at A14.
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because of their long-term effects, are exactly the kind of measures that are
clearly beyond the exigencies of the situation.
The United States rightfully criticized the creation of special military
courts to try civilians in other countries. In Peru under Fujimori, for example,
the autocratic regime used the excuse of the fight against the Shining Path
insurgency to institute “faceless courts,” both military and civilian in
composition.19 Inter-governmental monitoring bodies like the United Nations
(U.N.) Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights all pronounced those
courts as flagrant violations of Peru’s obligations under international human
rights treaties.20 If the rule in international law is clear in this regard, why
should the United States escape similar criticism? And more importantly, why
should other authoritarian regimes listen the next time the United States tries to
nudge them in the direction of respect for fundamental guarantees of due
process?
IV. MULTILATERALISM
President Bush deserves praise for having taken his time to respond to the
attacks of September 11, instead of rushing to a blind and irrational act of
retaliation. Given the mood of those days and the ill-advised proposals of
many commentators and experts with past service in international and security
affairs, the President’s measured but determined response avoided what could
have been a catastrophic retaliation.21 Also right from the start were his public
statements distinguishing the terrorists from Islam as a major world religion
and from Muslim peoples generally, including his well-publicized visit to a
mosque in Washington to show that Americans who profess the Islamic faith
are not to be blamed for the crimes of a few fanatics. The numerous acts of
discrimination and violence against Arab-Americans that erupted in the days
following September 11 would almost certainly have been more serious and
widespread had the President not taken this stance.
In the same sense, the Administration has correctly perceived that the
instant sympathy towards the United States felt around the world because of
19. Craig Mauro, Secretive Tribunals Helped Peru Defeat Terrorism—At a Cost,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, December 26, 2001, at A31; Jude Webber, Critics Liken Bush’s Tribunals to
Peru’s ‘Faceless” Judges Trials, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 18, 2001, at 35.
20. Loayza Tamayo, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 33, at para. 37 (1997); Castillo
Petruzzim, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 52, at para. 16 (1999).
21. As just two examples of irresponsible remarks by persons who should know better,
Laurence Eagleburger, a former Acting Secretary of State speaking on national television, called
for an “irrational response;” and in his column of September 28, 2001, Thomas Friedman, a
highly respected commentator, urged the Bush Administration to use to Russian mafia to kill Al
Qaeda members. Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs: Talk Later, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001,
at A31.
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the attacks on New York and Washington must be translated into a broad
coalition to act in many different ways against international terrorism. Among
other diplomatic initiatives, the United States sought and obtained Security
Council resolutions identifying these attacks as threats to the peace and
security of nations.22 The resolutions do not call on U.N. member States to act
militarily against Al Qaeda and governments that harbor terrorists, but
unmistakably proclaims that States targeted by international terrorism have a
right to act in self-defense.23 It could be argued that the resolutions are
superfluous, since the right to use force in self-defense is clearly stated in the
U.N. Charter and its exercise does not need a decision by the Security Council.
Nevertheless, it stands as a demonstration of U.S. commitment to act in
coordination with the rest of the world. The Administration also acted quickly
to obtain pronouncements by the organs of various security treaties to which
the United States is a party, including the first-time-ever invocation of
NATO’s provision that an attack on one member can be considered an attack
on all other members.24 Even though these decisions do not carry immediate
operational consequences for the war effort in Afghanistan (only a few small
allied contingents and the Afghan rebel force known as Northern Alliance are
presently fighting alongside U.S. forces), they are significant political gestures
of solidarity with the United States.
For our purposes, however, the decision to act in a multilateral fashion is
significant if it is more than an act of collective rubber-stamping of what the
United States will do anyway. When nations act in concert with other nations
the decision-making is more complicated and cumbersome, but the measures
thus adopted enjoy not only formal legality in international law, but also moral
and political legitimacy around the world. Multilateral bodies can and do
make mistakes; but consultations and collective decision-making add a
safeguard of deliberation and consensus without necessarily making action
impossible.
It remains to be seen, at this point, to what extent this spirit of
multilateralism will continue to guide the American response to terrorism. It is
encouraging that the United Nations was asked to organize a transitional
government in Afghanistan to replace the ousted Taliban regime, and to that

22. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); S.C. Res.
1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
23. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001); S.C. Res.
1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
24. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246
(invoking U.N. CHARTER art. 51 for the right of individual or collective self-defense). Statement
of Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General (Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/2001/s011002a.htm. The Western Hemisphere nations that are signatories, with the
United States, of the Rio Treaty on Reciprocal (military) Assistance (TIAR in Spanish), issued a
similar proclamation.
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effect sponsored conversations between several Afghan factions in Bonn,
Germany. The new government was inaugurated shortly before Christmas. If
tribal warfare and acts of revenge by the different factions that form the
Northern Alliance is to be prevented, American and British forces on the
ground must be willing to cooperate fully with U.N. peacekeepers and civilian
monitors in protecting persons and structures from random violence, and in
supporting the establishment and authority of new governmental institutions.
The Pentagon’s initial reluctance to support a peacekeeping force in
Afghanistan to protect the delivery of urgent relief services is problematic,
given the general agreement about the severity of the refugee and displaced
persons crisis.25 As of this writing (early January 2002), the United Kingdom
and Germany have deployed forces to ensure the security of the new Afghan
government; the extension of this peacekeeping force to protect relief services,
however, has not been decided.
So far, the multilateral approach has not extended to the human rightsrelated components of U.S. strategy. There has been no change in the hostility
that the Administration and its supporters in the United States show to the
creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC), even though the treaty that
created it enjoys the support of all democratic nations in the world.26 There is
an urgent need to revise the American position on the ICC as an important tool
to combat impunity for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity
wherever they occur. But it is also in the interest of the United States to have
recourse to an alternative tribunal—and one that does not displace legitimate
exercise of jurisdiction by American courts27—for those occasions in which
extradition to the United States cannot be obtained but surrender to an
international court with comparable due process guarantees is possible.
The Administration has also shown no interest in the creation of an ad hoc
court like those set up by the U.N. for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
even though both of those courts enjoyed decisive support—of a bipartisan
nature—from the United States. The idea has been proposed and discussed by
American experts in international law.28 There are problems with it: one is that
25. Eric Schmitt & James Dao, Bush Administration Says It’s Too Early to Deploy
International Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2001, at B2. See generally Michael R. Gordon,
U.S. and Britain at Odds Over Use and Timing of Peacekeeping Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2001, at 1B4.
26. Rome Statute, supra note 1. As of this writing, more than forty-five States—of the sixty
needed for the treaty to go into effect—have ratified it. The most recent ratifications have come
from the United Kingdom and Switzerland, two important allies of the U.S. On Dec. 31, 2000,
President Clinton signed the treaty, but the Bush administration has announced it will not ratify.
27. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 16-20.
28. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before the World, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2001, at A23; Koh, supra note 16. Though I agree with Professor Koh that there is no
need to displace the jurisdiction of federal courts to an international court in the matter of the
September 11 attacks, it seems to me that his comparison of Ms. Slaughter’s proposal with the
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courts created by the Security Council do enjoy preeminent jurisdiction over
all domestic courts, and in this case there is no reason to believe the regular
courts of the United States (as opposed to secret military commissions) are
incapable of affording a fair trail. Another problem—though this could
eventually become an advantage—is that the U.N. would insist that the
jurisdiction of a special court not be limited to the events of September 11, but
also extend to all breaches of the laws of war committed by all sides in military
actions taken in response to them. The prospect of non-American officials
investigating the behavior of American soldiers would trigger such opposition
from the Pentagon and from American isolationists that the idea would be
doomed from the start. At this point, and even though the debate seems
pointless, it is worth stating the obvious: if we are confident that our troops
operate in full compliance with the laws and customs of war, why should we
worry about inquiries by independent and impartial adjudicators? The antiICC and war-crimes-tribunals-for-others-but-not-for-us position would be
more convincing if there was a serious effort at self-examination by American
military authorities of the conduct of their own troops. As exemplified earlier
in this essay, responses to fair questions about incidents in the current as well
as in recent wars have been so dismal that one suspects the American
military’s hostility is not to foreign investigations into possible war crimes, but
to investigations, period.
A successful human rights policy by a major world power depends on
multilateralism in the same way the fight against terrorism needs the support of
other peace-loving nations. The United States can flex its muscle in criticizing
human rights violations by other nations and at times can even threaten to use
its considerable trade and assistance benefits as a bargaining chip to obtain
improvements in another country’s human rights record. But the experience of
the last twenty-five years shows that those measures are most effective when
they are used as part of a larger strategy that seeks the involvement of other
democratic allies and is justified on the findings of highly respected intergovernmental monitoring bodies. At the same time, resort to multilateralism
cannot be opportunistic. To be credible in its human rights overtures, the
American government must have a consistent strategy that combines its own
initiatives with approaches to international fora, especially those created with
the specific purpose of monitoring human rights.
At the same time, this will require reassessment of the United States
reluctance to sign and ratify human rights treaties, or to sign them with so
many reservations as to render them meaningless in actual legal effect. As
Professor Koh’s lecture in this Issue points out, the rest of the world
increasingly considers it hypocritical for the United States to lecture other
Executive Order creating special secret military courts is unfair. The latter is already positive
law, and is infinitely more dangerous to the rule of law than an international ad hoc court.
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nations about their adherence to universal standards while refusing to accept
those standards to guide its own performance. In recent years, this glaring
inconsistency has become an important limitation on the effectiveness of U.S.
human rights initiatives. The Administration’s policy toward intergovernmental human rights bodies is still unclear. Before September 11, some
key posts in missions to multilateral bodies were vacant, and since then all
other matters have understandably been subordinated to the priority of fighting
terrorism.
V. CONDITIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
In spite of the ominous signs of departure from a policy of promotion and
protection of rights everywhere, Harold Koh’s proposal deserves to be
discussed in detail and in depth in policy-making circles. The guiding
principles that he offers are not only sound; they are also well-thought-out
distillations of the relevant experience of the last twenty-five years. They have
a serious chance of being effective because they very accurately reflect the
priorities and new horizons of human rights protection in the current stage of
development of the universal human rights movement. For example, the
movement’s attention has shifted markedly—but relatively recently—from
putting a stop to the worst violations towards insisting on accountability for
gross violations.29 Koh’s guidelines also reflect the broad interest among
human rights activists to work on the private sector’s (business)
responsibilities for contributing to a culture of human rights compliance.30
Similarly, in ways that were not true a quarter century ago, human rights
activists around the world now value democracy and the rule of law—beyond
the formality of elections—as the most stable and enduring way of protecting
rights in each domestic jurisdiction.31
29. Efforts in Eastern Europe, South and Central America, South Africa, Yugoslavia and
Rwanda are examples of a relatively recent trend towards accountability for gross violations of
human rights. Different mechanisms such as truth commissions, domestic trials, and international
tribunals, among others, have been used to investigate and disclose the truth about violations that
took place, to identify and punish the perpetrators of those acts, to offer reparations and to prevent
the recurrence of those acts. Accountability for gross violations is now pursued both as a matter
of basic justice and as a means to overturn patterns of impunity.
30. A human rights culture is permeating the private sphere. Working conditions, child
labor and environmental practices, among others, are becoming important factors for investors
and consumers. Corporations can play a key role in protecting those and other rights, as their
economic power is a potentially important bargaining chip in molding political will to prevent or
deter human rights abuses.
31. See generally THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA
(Juan E. Méndez et al. eds., 1999); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Harold
Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999); DAVID BEETHAM, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1999). The Inter-American Democratic Charter approved by the General Assembly of the
Organizations of American States in September 2001 is a concrete outcome in terms of discussing
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For that reason, this response will not dwell too long on the principles
enumerated by Professor Koh, except to offer the following “friendly
amendments.” First, on the matter of accountability, it should be clarified that
truth and justice are in no way inimical to the idea of reconciliation as a goal of
a policy to reckon with abuses of the recent past. It is heartening to see that
Professor Koh emphasizes telling the truth in absolute terms.32 This is because
past efforts by national societies in transition to democracy to engage in public
acknowledgment of recent human rights tragedies did not necessarily enjoy
support from Washington.33 However, efforts to bring the perpetrators to
justice through fair prosecutions and trials should also be supported as a
desirable reestablishment of the rule of law. In that sense, I have some
reservations about “promoting accountability mixed with reconciliation,”
because the formulation seems to imply that prosecutions and reconciliation
are mutually exclusive, or that they can coexist only very uncomfortably.34
There are highly respected opinions to that effect in the literature on
Along with others, however, I disagree: true
transitional justice.35
reconciliation can only come after a process of recognition of the plight of the
victims and atonement by the victimizers for their crimes. Moreover, such a
process requires truth-telling and justice-making, both to be pursued in good
faith and to the best of the newly democratic State’s possibilities.36
Secondly, the proposal to engage private sectors, especially transnational
business enterprises, and recruit them to promote human rights abroad should
be tempered with some realism as to its likelihood of short-term success.
There is, of course, every reason to campaign hard and confront business
leaders with their responsibility as “good corporate citizens” for the creation of

the relationship between democracy and human rights. Inter-American Democratic Charter, at II,
San Jose Costa Rica Doc. AG (XXXI-0/01)/RES/1838 (June 5, 2001).
32. See generally Koh, supra note 1.
33. See Jerome J. Shestack, An Unsteady Focus: The Vulnerabilities of the Reagan
Administration’s Human Rights Policy, 2 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 25 (1989); Makau Wa Mutua,
The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 589 (1996).
34. Koh, supra note 1, at 295 (emphasis added).
35. See Jose Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The
Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
1425 (1992); ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED (2000); ADAM MICHNIK, LETTERS FROM
FREEDOM: POST-COLD WAR REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES (Irena Grudzinska Gross ed., 1998).
36. Juan E. Mendez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 255, 259 (1997); Juan
E. Mendez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW
IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, (A. James McAdams ed., 1997). See also ARYEH NEIER, WAR
CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1998); Diane F.
Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior
Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2543 n.14 (1991); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to
Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV.
449 (1990).
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humane conditions wherever they invest. This strategy presupposes that one
has to approach that dialogue without preconceptions or negative stereotypes
about business leaders and their degree of sympathy or intolerance for human
rights causes. The experience so far, however, is that this dialogue will not be
easy for some time to come. Instinctively, business leaders regard human
rights organizations—especially those in the countries where they invest—as
troublemakers. Their attitude is to ignore them for as long as possible, and
then to enter into, at best, a very wary dialogue, much the same way in which
they regard labor unions. They are also instantly opposed to policy tools that
the human rights movement uses: the promise of benefits of bilateral and
multilateral relations in exchange for specific human rights performance, and
the implicit and sometimes explicit threat of sanctions for the opposite
behavior. Business leaders (like diplomats in the 1970’s, when human rights
policy was initially implemented) believe and want the public to believe that
“quiet diplomacy” always succeeds. The fact that United States and
international corporations are a very dynamic force for trade and development
does not make them automatically a force for democratization and human
rights—at least not until the present dialogue can be carried out to deeper and
more meaningful levels. The Clinton Administration took an approach to this
issue that naively assumed business to be on the side of human rights, and that
there was never a conflict between the profit motive and human rights
protection.37 In my view, Koh’s lecture does so as well. It would be good to
continue this engagement, and to conduct it even more aggressively, but it is
necessary to do so with a higher dose of realism about the initial point of
departure of our interlocutors in the business world. Such realism would result
in more practical and effective ways to recruit business leaders to the cause of
human rights.
I turn now to some fundamental conditions for the legitimacy and
prospects of success of a strategy to include human rights in a great nation’s
foreign policy. As it will be readily understood, the following ideas are
intended to complement Professor Koh’s suggestions, and are not meant to
imply that he has ignored them. For the reasons set forth in the first part of this
essay, however, the events since September 11 call into question the very
existence of those conditions, which is why it is important to spell them out.
A.

Pursuit of Human Rights for their Own Sake

When we argue that human rights should occupy a central position in the
design and implementation of foreign policy, we mean they should not be
promoted and defended only when they do not risk collision with other foreign
policy interests. They are certainly not the only interest of the United States in
37. A good example of this Clinton Administration approach is the matter of U.S.-China
relations.
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its relations with the world, but neither should they be an afterthought. There
are powerful sectors in the United States whose ideological approach to foreign
relations is either of isolationism and detachment, or of assertion of U.S.
presence through flexing diplomatic and military muscle. Both sectors are
well represented in the administration of George W. Bush, though it would be
unfair to say that other, more sensible views are excluded. The risk is
therefore high that human rights will be used only when convenient to other
interests; the fear is that they will be put aside when they are thought to be in
conflict with the “national interest of the U.S.,” however vaguely defined; and
that they will be rhetorically twisted and manipulated to serve as an argument
for policies abroad that bear little resemblance to human rights promotion and
protection.
There is nothing speculative about this scenario. Many persons occupying
key positions in the Bush Administration are veterans of the ideological wars
of the 1980’s, when Ronald Reagan and Alexander Haig arrived in
Washington vowing to undo the human rights policy of the Carter years, to
relegate human rights concerns to the bottom of the agenda and to substitute
them for a concern for “terrorism.”38 It must also be said that this early
approach experimented with an important shift midway through Reagan’s first
term, in large part because of the success of the then incipient human rights
movement in challenging it. After a landmark address by Reagan to the British
Parliament, the Reagan Administration embraced human rights more positively
and launched its own brand of a foreign policy that included such rights.39
Democracy promotion was made a centerpiece of that policy and, though at
first the emphasis was too much on the formalities of elections, there is no
question that this approach contributed effectively to today’s recognition of the
“democratic entitlement” as central to the universal human rights agenda.40
Still, the banner of electoral democracy was not strong enough to force
American officials to recognize the seriously undemocratic character of the
forces they supported abroad, like the armed forces of El Salvador and
Guatemala, or the autocratic rule of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire (now Congo).
Support for these undemocratic—and in some cases murderous—forces had
the effect of needlessly prolonging war and suffering in Central America and

38. See National Security Decision, Ronald Reagan, Directive No. 30 (Apr. 10, 1982);
National Security Decision, Ronald Reagan, Directive No. 138 (Apr. 26, 1984); National Security
Decision, Ronald Reagan, Directive No. 180 (July 19, 1985); and National Security Decision,
Ronald Reagan, Directive No. 207 (Jan. 20, 1986), all available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
offdocs/nsdd.
39. Ronald Reagan, Speech to the House of Commons (June 8, 1982), available at
http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rr40/speeches/empire.htm.
40. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L.
46 (1992).
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repression and instability in Africa.41 In Central America, peace only came
when U.S. interest seemed to wane and the U.N. and democratic Central
American leaders were allowed to search for a peace process by themselves.42
It also resulted in discredit to human rights when those officials (some of
whom are back in key posts in the new Administration) lied to Congress and to
the American people about a variety of matters: the responsibility of allies for
the murder of the Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter in San
Salvador in November 1989, the extent of covert actions in Nicaragua and the
real record of the U.S.-supported contras, the failure of U.S. advisors to curb
abuses by those under their tutelage, and the retention of paid intelligence
agents known to be torturers and killers.43
B.

Consistency

A corollary of the previous condition is that a human rights policy should
call a human rights violation by its name, without exaggerating it, without softpedaling it, and without a determination of whether it was committed by a
State or force that is perceived to be a “friend” or a “foe” of the United States.
Admittedly, this was a much more serious problem when the Cold War
dominated American (and others’) reflexes about trouble spots in the Third
World. It is now much more possible to act affirmatively in those places
without fear of giving an advantage to an ideological and security competitor
like the Soviet Union was until 1989. On the other hand, the public debate
after September 11 has been full of ideas that revive the 1980’s debates about
“totalitarian” and “friendly authoritarian” regimes.44
The views of security experts are much better publicized in the mass media
these days than those of foreign policy analysts and, of course, much more than
those of human rights experts. This may well reflect the mood of the Nation
after September 11, as well as the need felt by the American public to be
reassured that there are ways to deal with the terrorist threat. It should be
41. See CHRISTIAN SMITH, RESISTING REAGAN: THE U.S. CENTRAL AMERICA PEACE
MOVEMENT (1996).
42. Id.
43. The elite Atlacatl Battalion of the Salvadoran Army, a showcase of U.S. training, is a
case in point. Only weeks after its inauguration its soldiers murdered more than 150 old men,
women and children in several hamlets known as El Mozote. See Mark Danner, THE MASSACRE
AT EL MOZOTE: A PARABLE OF THE COLD WAR (1994). Towards the end of its ten-year
existence, it crowned this dismal record with the murder of the Jesuit priests in 1989. As for paid
intelligence agents, in the late 1990’s it was revealed that a Guatemalan colonel named Alpirez, a
valued asset of the CIA, was personally involved in the disappearance, torture and murder of
Efrain Bamaca, a guerrilla leader married to American attorney Jennifer Harbury.
44. Robert D. Kaplan, The Faceless Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2001, at 11 (reviewing
PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2001) and ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN,
TERRORISM, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: DEFENDING THE
U.S. HOMELAND (2001)).
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obvious, however, that over-reliance on the ideas of security experts carries the
danger that those ideas will preempt concern for civil liberties and international
human rights and undo most of what has been gained since the 1970’s in the
global promotion of freedom. For example, Robert D. Kaplan, a senior fellow
at the New America Foundation, writes:
if the war on terrorism goes on for many years, all kinds of back-room
maneuvering will be required, as was the case during the cold war. The
subtlety necessary for waging the cold war—in which we supported odious
regimes on one hand and made deals with the Soviet Union and China on the
other—made it far less popular among many Americans than it now appears.
As with the cold war, defeating the enemy will prove impossible without the
help of governments that do not necessarily reflect our values . . . . And if we
are hamstrung by absolutist definitions of friend and foe, and democracy and
dictatorship, our chance of victory will be diminished.45

This view is a simplistic and untested assimilation of the terrorist threat to the
challenge posed by Communism for most of the twentieth century. It also
credits deception, power politics and the support of unsavory regimes with a
success in winning the Cold War that is unsupported. In fact, it can be argued
that the introduction of a human rights policy, even though inconsistently
applied, provided the West with a moral superiority over totalitarianism that
eventually assured the 1989 outcome. The quick abandonment of consistency
for the sake of expediency in the immediate struggle against terrorism can
result in a Manichean (and cynically deceptive, as Kaplan admits) view of
friends and enemies.46 Democratic forces that share our values will not be
supported unless they offer an immediate military advantage in the fight
against terrorism. On the other hand, despots and autocrats, even if they are
exporters of terrorism, like the current leadership in Pakistan, will be given a
pass for any human rights violation they may commit as long as they profess to
be on our side in the struggle. The United States, and unfortunately also the
democracies of Europe, have openly renounced criticism of Russia for the
brutal way in which it conducts its war in Chechnya.47 China will enjoy a
long-term suspension of criticism, even of a friendly “quiet diplomacy” type,
for its subjugation of Tibet, its suppression of the democracy movement, and
its lack of freedom of expression and association.48 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
will not have to expect any reminder that their treatment of women is
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See statement by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder on Sept. 26, 2001, quoted in
Joseph Fitchett, U.S. Policy on Terrorism: Think Globally and Don’t Interfere Locally,
INTERNAT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 28, 2001, at 10; Gwynne Dyer, Russia’s Integration Behind
Putin’s Burst of Generosity, THE SOUTHLAND TIMES (NEW ZEALAND), Nov. 19, 2001, at 6.
48. See Michael Ignatieff, Is the Human Rights Era Ending?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at
A25.
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universally objectionable; from now on we will only defend women’s rights
against regimes we consider supportive of terrorism, like the now-defunct
Taliban.
On the question of consistency, President Bush has offered a reassuring
definition of terrorism in a recent speech to the U.N. General Assembly when
he said, “In this world there are good causes and bad causes, and we may
disagree on where the line is drawn. Yet, there is no such thing as a good
terrorist. No national aspiration, no remembered wrong can ever justify the
deliberate murder of the innocent.”49 This is a welcome statement; it may yet
prove useful in establishing the bona fide character of the United States as a
peace broker in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, which in turn would
contribute enormously to reduce the conditions that are invoked to breed
international terrorism in parts of the Islamic world. It should be applied
immediately to correct the behavior of direct allies of the United States, like
elements in the Afghan Northern Alliance, and General Pervez Musharraf, the
military ruler of Pakistan. The United States should publicly force the former
to investigate, prosecute and punish violations of the laws of war that have
been denounced in the past few weeks, like attacks on civilians, the elimination
of Taliban soldiers who were hors de combat and the extremely suspicious
circumstances of the prison riot of late November where hundreds of
surrendered soldiers lost their lives.50 Musharraf must be told that his current
honeymoon with Washington requires him to take steps towards democratizing
his country and to renounce support for terrorism against India in Kashmir.51
The President’s speech to the U.N. may signal a new era, and a final
abandonment of the morally bankrupt tendency in the 1980s to label “terrorist”
any force fighting an “ally” of the United States, no matter how unsavory that
ally was, and “freedom fighter” any violent group doing the bidding of the
United States.52 Thus, RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola,53
49. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to United Nations General
Assembly, President Bush Speaks to United Nations (Nov. 10, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html).
50. Nicholas Watt, War in Afghanistan: Robinson Calls for Deaths Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN
(LONDON), Nov. 30, 2001; Barry Bearak et al., Uncertain Toll in the Fog War: Civilian Deaths in
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002.
51. Though it is too early to tell, it is fair to say that pressures from India and perhaps also
from the United States are forcing Pakistan to take the right steps to avoid a major conflict
between nuclear powers, among other things by outlawing and arresting persons suspected of
terrorism. David E. Sanger, Bush’s South Asia Strategy: Keeping Terrorism as Villain, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, at A1.
52. See Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a White House Reception for Private Sector Supporters
of United States Assistance for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, Mar. 21, 1986, available
at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1986/32186a.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
53. Kurt Shillinger, A Revealing Tale of 2 African Elections, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 10,
1999, at 31; Howard W. French, Exit Savimbi and the Cold War in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
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and the contras in Nicaragua, were hailed as freedom fighters despite their
amply documented record of atrocities.
Meanwhile, the Republican
administration did nothing to obtain the release of Nelson Mandela from
prison, but rather gave ammunition to the apartheid regime to stay in power
because the white supremacists of South Africa were staunch antiCommunists.54 Officials in the Reagan Administration, now serving again
under President Bush, should not be allowed to forget that their attack on
terrorism did not extend to what in Latin America was aptly labeled “State
Terrorism” –the campaign of executions, torture and disappearances waged
against their own people by the now discredited (but at that time considered
“friendly authoritarian”) regimes of Pinochet in Chile, Videla in Argentina,
and the unaccountable armed forces of Honduras.55
C. Human rights conditionality
The relative success of the enterprise of promoting and protecting human
rights everywhere through U.S. foreign policy can be attributed to the wisdom
of Congress in establishing laws that the State Department must follow in
designing and implementing policy towards other countries. Several statutes
direct the Executive Branch to make foreign assistance to other nations
conditional on the human rights performance of their governments.56 In fact,
the same statutes provide for ample discretion on the part of the Executive
Branch to decide when and when not to apply these sanctions, subject to
oversight by the relevant committees of Congress. As a result, there have not
been too many actual suspensions of aid for these reasons.57 Nevertheless, the
debate generated in Congress and in the media over the possibility of sanctions
has always been a powerful tool to promote changes in the behavior of
governments.

2002; Mahmood Mamdani, Uganda Turn Off Your Tunnel Vision, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2002, at
B03.
54. ALLISTER SPARKS, THE MIND OF SOUTH AFRICA 348 (1990).
55. See STATE ORGANIZED TERROR: THE CASE OF VIOLENT INTERNAL REPRESSION (P.
Timothy Bushnell et al. eds., 1991); Ana Baron, Kissinger fue clave en el apoyo de EE.UU. a la
dictadura argentina, CLARIN, Jan. 6, 2001, available at http://www.clarin.com (last visited Feb.
6, 2002) (citing documents declassified by the State Department).
56. The most significant statute is § 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994 & Supp. V. 1999)). By
its terms, the United States is mandated not to provide foreign assistance to any country whose
government engages in a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights.” Other statutes oblige the U.S. representative in international financial institutions
to vote against loans to countries under the same standard. The U.S. Trade Representative is
bound by law to condition trade benefits on the observance of labor rights.
57. Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS, 1315-34 (2d ed. 2000).
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At the same time, there has been little consistency in the decisions made to
suspend military aid, military sales, development assistance, economic support
funds and other material instruments of foreign policy over the years.58 Lack
of consistency has conspired against the success of the policy, by alerting
repressive governments that the way to avoid sanctions need not necessarily
involve actual improvement in human rights performance. Sometimes all it
takes is an ability to give the U.S. Administration rhetorical tools to proclaim
improvements even if they are not real, or to offer reasons why it would not be
in the “national interest of the United States” to apply sanctions in a particular
case.
For those reasons—and given the anti-terrorist campaign in which the
United States is presently embarked—it is to be expected that this arsenal of
carrots and sticks will be used even more assiduously in the near future for
purposes other than the protection and promotion of human rights. Also, we
can expect that they will be used in even more arbitrary and inconsistent ways
than has been the case so far. In the months and years ahead, therefore, it will
be necessary to insist on the need for this legislation to be taken seriously by
every administration. The credibility of the effort to promote human rights
values around the world will depend on the prudent use of these instruments.
If waivers are to be used, it is important that they are carefully and clearly
explained to the public. If sanctions are to be applied, it is even more
important to be able to justify them in terms of the severity of the situation to
be addressed, and in comparison to similar situations where the United States
can exert its influence.
It will also be important to invite other democratic nations to incorporate
human rights values into their own foreign policies. For a long time U.S.
efforts in this direction were hampered by the fact that repressive countries
could rely on trade, military and development assistance to flow to them from
other large countries. The European Union, among other large donor blocs and
countries, now conditions development assistance on democratic values and
human rights performance.59 On this matter, multilateral approaches are also
important. It would be wise, therefore, for a U.S. foreign policy centered on
human rights to apply the laws in the American books on conditionality, but
also to seek the active solidarity of other powerful nations with the victims of
abuses in other lands.

58. LARS SCHOULTZ, BENEATH THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD
LATIN AMERICA (1998).
59. See, e.g., Council Regulation 443/97 of 29 October 2001 On Operations to Aid Uprooted
People in Asian and Latin American Developing Countries, arts. 1, 3, 11, 2001 O.J. (L 287) 3,
available at http://europa.eu.int.
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D. Accurate Reporting
The annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices issued by the
Department of State have become an important indication of the commitment
of the United States to universal standards of protection of rights.60 Whatever
else the United States may say or do about human rights violations in other
countries, the high quality and accuracy of the Country Reports have made
them an important tool. They are highly regarded by readers around the world
because they present a truthful picture of the situation in each country. Since
there is a great degree of uniformity in their format, they also provide a fair
standard to make comparisons, not only between countries but also in
measuring improvements or setbacks in a single country over several years.
At first, some of the Country Reports were neither objective nor truthful,
and for that reason U.S.-based human rights organizations annually published
critiques of them as a way to generate a useful debate about the state of human
rights in key countries around the world.61 This practice of alternative reports
undoubtedly contributed to the improvement, year by year, in the quality of the
official State Department reports. In that process, diplomatic personnel in
every American embassy abroad were charged with gathering information
from all sources and drafting early versions of the annual report. The staff of
the Bureau of Human Rights also became more proficient each year in doublechecking the accuracy of the drafts and providing a uniform structure and
format. As Professor Koh states, in recent years the Country Reports have
become so accurate and reliable that the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights has decided to discontinue the practice of writing critiques.
It must be stated that the improvement in the quality of reporting began in
the 1980’s, as the Reagan Administration waged rhetorical battles with U.S.based NGOs about the true state of human rights in many countries. In spite of
the highly charged nature of the subject matter, the professionalization of the
reporting process transcended politics. The State Department bureaucracy
embraced the concept of human rights, understood the value of truthfulness in
reporting, and now engages in a serious, credible annual exercise. In the
process, the Country Reports have become indispensable reading material for
other government agencies, Congress, human rights advocates, and even for
foreign officials, journalists and other decision-makers. They now contribute
significantly in each country to the development of domestic human rights
policies; they objectively support the findings of domestic monitors, even if
those findings are unpopular with the governments. In that sense, they are a
60. 22 U.S.C. § 2304.
61. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR)
published joint reports in the early and mid-1980s. Later LCHR continued publishing the
Critiques, while HRW published annual reports on the Administration’s policies toward certain
countries.
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source of important moral support for the victims of abuse, and provide a
protective cover to human rights defenders who often conduct their work in
difficult circumstances.
The country reports have sometimes had the effect of highlighting the
inconsistency of U.S. policies towards some countries. Although it would be
desirable that American relations with repressive governments were always
consistent with the condemnation of their practices made in the country
reports, it is better to have that inconsistency than to make the country reports
tailor the truth to serve what are perceived to be U.S. interests in those
countries. Reporting on human rights practices around the world must
continue to live up to the present high standard if promotion and protection of
fundamental freedoms is to be effective.
E.

Self-criticism and root causes of violations

Even when the United States criticizes policies of repressive governments
(or of repressive actors and institutions in democratic regimes), public opinion
in those countries often distrusts the intentions of different American
administrations.62 This in turn conspires to limit the effectiveness of American
statements and measures. One reason for this distrust is that American
officials almost never acknowledge any history of past American support for
those repressive state agents or institutions. Year after year, the State
Department acts as if it was writing on a clean slate, especially when it comes
to U.S. support for repressive policies in the past. This is not to say that all
human rights violations of the present can be traced to American mistakes of
the past; that would be an extreme and simplistic view of the world, and one
that unduly relieves actual perpetrators of atrocities—and the societies in
which they commit them—from their own responsibilities.
It would, however, lend credibility to U.S. efforts to promote human rights
if there were some acknowledgment that past support for undemocratic forces,
whatever the context in which it happened, is no longer countenanced and will
not be countenanced in the future. Acknowledgments of past error, like the
one made by President Clinton regarding the international community’s failure
to respond adequately to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, have been all too
rare.63 It has been almost impossible in our day to elicit some recognition from
relevant actors—for example, that U.S. plots to bring about a coup d’etat in
Chile in 1973 was fairly interpreted by General Pinochet as a blank check to

62. La Argentina y los derechos humanos, LA NACION (ARGENTINA), Mar. 14, 2002.
63. Holly J. Burkhalter, The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration and
Rwanda, 11 WORLD POL’Y J. 44 (1994).
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engage in criminal policies towards dissidents.64 We are still waiting to hear
some expression of regret from high officials in the Reagan Administration
that defended the Argentine military regime as a “friendly authoritarian”
government, and turned a blind eye to the tragedy of forced disappearances of
thousands of victims.65
More pertinent to the issues of the day, there is hardly any debate about
U.S. responsibility for the Frankenstein-like creation of a monster that later
became the Taliban and Al Qaeda, when it was expeditious to the struggle to
prevent the Soviet Union from establishing a foothold in Afghanistan. In the
United States, policies are always formulated on the basis of the immediate
need, with little effort to learn the lessons of recent history. Such a short
memory span will probably condemn the United States to repeat its mistakes.
It is even more troubling to see a rush to engage again in support for the “dirty
war” tactics of allies, on the grounds that the present emergency justifies it.
Since September 11, there have been numerous proposals to lift the ban on
assassinations and on hiring foreign agents known to be engaged in torture and
killings.66 The prohibition on murder of foreign leaders was imposed on the
CIA as a result of the revelations of the committee chaired by Senator Frank
Church in the 1970’s.67 The restriction on employing torturers and killers as
“foreign assets” came about in the late 1990’s, when it was revealed that a
Guatemalan colonel in the payroll of the CIA had been involved in the murder
of a guerrilla leader married to American attorney Jennifer Harbury.68 In
recent weeks, and as the campaign in Afghanistan started, many voices called
for the lifting of those restrictions.69
There is also the tendency to disregard the long-term contributing factors
to present-day challenges when designing and implementing responses. The
extreme poverty and hopelessness that results from the anarchic process of

64. Evo Popoff, Inconsistency and Impunity in International Human Rights Law: Can the
International Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda and Augusto Pinochet
Cases, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 363 (2001).
65. David Weissbrodt & Maria Luisa Bartolomei, The Effectiveness of International Human
Rights Pressures: The Case of Argentina, 1976-1983, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1991).
66. Friedman, supra note 21; Walter Pincus & Dan Eggen, New Powers Sought for
Surveillance; Assasination Ban May Be Lifted for CIA, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2001, at A01.
67. Church Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rep. No. 94-465 (1975)
and Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), issued by President Gerald
Ford.
68. Linda Greenhouse, Widow Argues for Right to Sue Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002,
at A19.
69. The BBC reported in October that the restrictions may have been quietly lifted. See
CIA’s Licence to Kill, BBC NEWS, Oct. 23, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
world/newsid_1613000/1613423.stm; Fighting a ‘dirty war,’ BBC NEWS, Sept. 21, 2001,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1555000/1555760.stm.
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globalization does not justify the resort to fanaticism and terror. Likewise,
communities that have been marginalized and humiliated by war and
occupation, and by unjust settlement of disputes, do not have for that reason a
right to irrational reactions. But it does not take much of an effort to see that
poverty and humiliation is the breeding ground where intolerance, irrationality
and fanaticism grow. In this sense, the urgency of military answers to
terrorism should not obscure the vision of our policy-makers; they should
realize that a purely military solution to today’s problems will cause such
destruction and hopelessness as to ensure the future reproduction of the
Talibans and Al Qaedas.
If for no other reason than the need to prevent future terrorism, U.S.
policies to promote and protect human rights in other lands should incorporate
a serious concern for the material conditions in which democracy and human
rights can flourish. Those conditions are directly linked to the urgent reduction
of extreme poverty and to the promotion of equality and non-discrimination
and the creation of economic opportunity.
III. CONCLUSION
At present, it would seem like a quarter century of a bipartisan policy
designed to promote human rights and freedoms everywhere may not survive
the current emergency. There are, of course, serious grounds to consider the
post-September 11 events a challenge that requires extraordinary measures.
Yet, the tendency to present the situation in the starkest terms is both
misleading and dangerous. Despite the extreme gravity of the losses suffered
on September 11, the United States is not facing a threat to “the life of the
[N]ation,” such as would justify exceptional measures in accordance with
international human rights law.70 The domestic measures adopted by the
Department of Justice affecting civil liberties are presently directed mostly
against non-Americans, but they affect the quality of life for all persons living
in this country. More significantly, they constitute an unnecessary and
unlawful departure from the proudest American traditions of rule of law.
Similarly, American interest in promoting and protecting the rights of
persons around the world will probably take a very low priority in the current
climate, especially if that interest is perceived as in conflict with the more
urgent designation of allies and adversaries according to each country’s
attitude towards the campaign against international terrorism.
If either of these pessimistic scenarios materializes, the suicidal attackers
of September 11 will have won an important victory. Their main objective,
and that of their masterminds, was to provoke the United States into

70. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
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abandoning its tradition of tolerance and pluralism and to conjure up the ugly
face of repression.
On the other hand, civil liberties in the domestic setting and human rights
promotion as part of foreign policy have one thing in common: they both stem
from values that Americans cherish and try to practice every day. For that
reason, it is perhaps safe to remain confident that in the long run civil liberties
and human rights will survive the current menace and endure as long-term
practices and policies of this country.71

71. Ignatieff, supra note 48; see also Roberta Cohen and Kenneth Roth, Letters To the
Editor, in Human Rights: The Long View, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A28.
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